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LAW AND THE STABLE SELF 
REBECCA HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Childress Lecture, john a. powell noted that Enlightenment thinking 
proposed a unitary, stable, reason-based self.1  Enlightenment writers also 
suggested that individuals had transparency of mind, such that they could fully 
know those true and unchanging selves.2  Further, powell added, when one 
views individuals as stable, rational actors with unchanging preferences and 
behavior, it is easy to imagine the law largely as a backdrop against which 
action occurs and is subsequently regulated.3  Professor powell argued that just 
as Einstein replaced Newton with a relative rather than absolute theory of 
physics, so too the time has come to reconceptualize the role of the state from a 
“neutral non actor in the universe” to one in which the state has the capacity to 
“change[] the . . . actions of people via laws, regulations, and agency action.”4  
In reality, powell posited, individual behavior is affected directly by the actions 
of the state: the structure of laws and regulations can change the way that 
individuals make decisions and take action.5 
At the same time, powell highlighted the Enlightenment’s extensive 
reliance on scientific knowledge to structure its logic and conclusions.6  
Modern psychology—relying on Enlightenment principles of scientific 
 
* Associate Professor, Washington University Law School.  Thanks to Professor Joel Goldstein 
for including me in the 2009 Childress Lecture program.  Thanks also to Matt Bodie, Emily 
Hughes, and Molly Wilson for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. 
 1. john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond an 
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1035–40 (2010).  David Hume notably 
wrote, “It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, 
in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and 
operations.  The same motives always produce the same actions.”  DAVID HUME, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 80, 83 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1902). 
 2. See, e.g., 2 PETER GAY, THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 177 (1969); Thomas McCarthy, 
Enlightenment and the Idea of Public Reason, in QUESTIONING ETHICS: CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES IN PHILOSOPHY 164, 164–65 (Richard Kearney & Mark Dooley eds., 1999). 
 3. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1064–67. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. GAY, supra note 2, at 176; McCarthy, supra note 2, at 168, 173. 
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knowledge7—has made great strides in understanding the human mind, yet one 
consistent finding of psychological research is that much of our behavior and 
mental processes depend on a dizzying array of contexts, situations, and 
stimuli.  Kurt Lewin, the founder of social psychology, suggested that all 
behavior is a function of the self plus the societal situation.8  Indeed, in light of 
modern research on the importance of external cues and stimuli, it is difficult 
to conceptualize a completely stable, rational actor who remains constant in 
her preferences and behavior across settings.  The unitary, transparent, reason-
based self—the consistently rational actor of the Enlightenment—is not real.  
Instead, our mental processes and behavior are adaptable, changeable, and 
often context-specific.9 
In this Article, I examine several findings in social psychology related to 
individuals’ preferences, and I explore how those findings subvert the 
Enlightenment vision of a stable and knowable self in ways that are quite 
relevant to law.  I first explore one well-known finding in the cognitive bias 
literature, the status quo bias, and marshal some of the research suggesting 
ways in which this bias may affect individuals’ behavior vis-à-vis legal 
systems.  Second, I discuss the potential ways in which temporal construal 
research—research on the way in which individuals see things differently 
depending on the time frame in which the events will occur—may relate to 
legal systems.  Finally, I address how well some of the fundamental premises 
of our litigation system dovetail with psychological research on what 
individuals want.  Our civil legal system is predicated on the recovery of 
money for harm done, but research suggests that money damages may be 
inadequate to meet some basic human desires. 
I.  STATUS QUO BIAS 
As Professor powell notes, the law, and the actors who create it, are a 
powerful force influencing human action.  Psychological research on the status 
quo suggests that individuals have a strong preference for things remaining as 
 
 7. GAY, supra note 2, at 180–81; THOMAS MUNCK, THE ENLIGHTENMENT A 
COMPARATIVE SOCIAL HISTORY 1721–1794, at 12, 14 (2000); Edward E. Jones, Major 
Developments in Five Decades of Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 16–17 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 8. Lewin developed the concept of the “life space,” which is the interdependent relationship 
between the individual and her environment.  Lewin’s “grand truism” is B=f(PE)—that is, 
behavior is a function of the person and the environment.   Jones, supra note 7, at 35. 
 9. This is not to say that we have no true identity, of course—just that we are not 
completely stable, unchanging actors across contexts.  The larger debate in psychology between 
“situationism” and “dispositionism”—that is, between the importance of the environment and the 
importance of individual characteristics—is robust and well beyond the scope of this short 
Article. 
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they are, regardless of what those things look like.10  This preference for the 
status quo means that the way in which the law is structured may lead to 
behavioral consequences.  When the law creates certain endowments, those 
endowments become a status quo from which individuals are reluctant to 
depart. 
So, for example, consider insurance.  An Enlightenment devotee might 
imagine—even one open to the potential influence of situational factors—that 
risk preferences are one aspect of the self that would be more stable across 
situations and less subject to manipulation by the governing legal regime.  
Some people, this story would go, would be innately risk-seeking (sky-diving, 
non-seatbelt wearing, motorcycle riding), while others would be innately risk-
averse (seatbelt wearing, speed-limit obeying, helmet wearing).  Take this 
premise, and add to it a regime of required automobile insurance that offers 
two options: one option provides more coverage for more money and the other 
option provides less coverage for less money.  Individuals are likely to have 
some preference between these choices based on their orientation towards risk.  
Those who prefer more risk would be likely to choose the limited coverage; 
those who prefer less risk would be likely to choose comprehensive 
coverage.11  Purely risk-neutral individuals would be likely to choose the 
lower-cost option. 
Now add to this premise two potential legal structures.  In the first legal 
structure, the state requires the buyer to purchase a basic level of insurance, 
and allows the buyer to pay more for additional coverage.  In the second, the 
state asks the buyer to purchase a broader package of insurance, with an option 
to decline a portion of the coverage and pay a lower price.  In the first option, 
the status quo is the basic insurance, and one can pay more for added coverage.  
In the second option, the status quo is the comprehensive coverage, and one 
can pay less for more limited coverage.  In the world of the Enlightenment 
self—the rational actor—individual choices should remain the same: those 
with a high risk preference should still choose the limited coverage, those with 
a low risk preference should still choose the more comprehensive plan, and 
those with a neutral risk preference will choose the lowest-cost option.  
Imagine two adjacent states, one of which offers its drivers the choices in the 
first scenario and one of which offers its drivers the choices in the second 
scenario.  Unless people in one state are systematically more risk averse than 
 
 10. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197–99 (1991). 
 11. I do not mean to suggest that this fairly simplistic example explains or captures the 
complex set of decisions involved in the selection of insurance.  Issues of cost, resources, and 
probabilities, to name a few, are surely likely to impact these decisions as well.  See, e.g., 
Kahneman, supra note 10, at 199 (discussing a study of insurance policy choices in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania). 
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people in another state, the percentage of people who choose the 
comprehensive coverage versus the limited coverage should be roughly similar 
in the different states, regardless of which plan the state presents as the default 
option. 
And yet research suggests that this is not the case.  Eric Johnson and his 
colleagues report that when drivers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey were 
offered these two different plans, more drivers chose the comprehensive 
coverage when it was the standard plan;12  more drivers chose, conversely, the 
limited coverage when it was offered as the standard plan.13  Certainly, there 
must have been drivers who would have chosen the same option in either 
location, but there are also many individuals whose preferences appeared to be 
largely shaped by the structure of the legal rule around insurance.14  Because 
state laws mandate car insurance15 and may set a default option for drivers, the 
nature of the default is likely to significantly affect the level of insurance 
chosen and, consequently, how much money consumers pay into the insurance 
system.  The self is malleable in light of the legal regime, and the individual is 
shaped by the law in ways that are often invisible to the self rather than 
transparent.16 
Because the law sets the status quo in many ways, it is important to 
recognize the impact that status quo regulations may have on human 
behavior.17  The structure of the law is not a neutral backdrop against which 
people make decisions.18  If the architects of legal systems wish to encourage 
 
 12. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 22 (2009). 
 16. The past decade has seen a vast increase in literature detailing ways in which these 
decisional biases and heuristics affect individual behavior.  See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY 
IRRATIONAL, at i, xii (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–7 (Penguin Books 2009). 
 17. The status quo has important effects in the legal context even outside of the endowments 
provided by law.  For example, Russell Korobkin found that parties valued contract terms 
differently depending on what was provided as the default term.  Russell Korobkin, The Status 
Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 639–41 (1998). 
 18. The Coase Theorem suggests that the legal endowments of a particular legal regime will 
not matter to the ultimate outcome when people can bargain for optimal solutions and when 
transaction costs are low or nonexistent.  See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & 
ECON. 1, 15 (1960).  Indeed, in many cases it is transaction costs that are the problem, preventing 
optimal resolutions.  But in this and other cases, the transaction costs are low.  Here, the 
transaction costs when one must choose between options do not really differ very much.  Instead, 
it is something more fundamental that contravenes the Coase Theorem in this case: it is a change 
in the way that individuals understand their choices, merely by virtue of which choice is the 
default and which is the alternative.  One might almost imagine that choosing the non-default 
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or discourage certain types of behavior within a set of choices, changing the 
structure of the law is an effective way to shift people’s decisions.  In many 
ways, the law does this implicitly, without a clear mandate from the people or 
even the legislature.  That is, it is not clear that constituents or legislators are 
aware of the effects of the law’s endowments.  When we assume that the law is 
a non-actor, and that individuals have stable preferences, we may end up with 
legal systems that shape human action in ways that we neither realize nor 
explicitly condone.  An understanding of the active role that legal rules can 
play in shaping both preferences and behavior is an important step in ensuring 
an optimal legal system. 
II.  TEMPORAL CONSTRUAL 
The law assumes a unitary, stable actor whose preferences do not change 
over time.  Contract law, for instance, is predicated upon the stable preferences 
of individuals.19  When entering into a contract, the present self binds the 
future self to a course of action approved only by the present self.  As a general 
matter, we do not allow the future self, even if that self sees things differently, 
to simply disavow the actions of the former self.  The future self, in other 
words, is bound to the terms of the contract negotiated by a different temporal 
actor.  The law of contracts supposes a world in which the preferences of the 
present and future selves are identical, yet social science research has shown 
that this is not the case.  In particular, the present self is not able to accurately 
forecast the preferences of the future self, leading to potential commitment 
errors. 
Part of this inaccuracy stems from the way that individuals think about 
choices over time.  Psychologists have suggested that temporal distance to a 
future event changes the way in which individuals construe those events.20  
Construal level theory, or CLT, proposes that people systematically think 
differently about events in the near future versus events in the distant future.21  
Specifically, individuals use “higher level construals” to think about events in 
the distant future, and “lower level construals” when thinking about events in 
the near future.22  Abstract features that capture the essential nature of an event 
are considered “higher level construals,” whereas the concrete and specific 
details of the events are considered “lower level construals.”23  Research 
 
option adds psychological transaction costs because deviating from the status quo is difficult for 
people. 
 19. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 219 (4th ed. 2004). 
 20. Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 405 
(2003). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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suggests that individuals simply think differently about the same events when 
they are located differentially in time.24 
For example, in one psychological study, individuals given an activity such 
as “locking the door” were asked to choose between alternative restatements of 
that same activity, including the very concrete physical act of “putting a key in 
the lock” and the far more conceptual goal of “securing the house.”25  When 
the time frame for locking the door was tomorrow, individuals were more 
likely to choose the restatement that described the concrete physical behavior; 
when the time frame was sometime next year, individuals were more likely to 
choose the abstract goal of the action.26  CLT’s supporting research suggests 
that when people contemplate actions that are imminent, they think of all the 
mundane, messy, everyday details, and when they contemplate actions in the 
distant future, they distill them to their conceptual essence.27 
CLT is applicable not just to descriptions of events but also to individual 
preferences about future options.  Near-future preferences are more complex 
and harder to reduce to essential elements, whereas distant-future preferences 
are more unified and cohesive.28  Consequently, psychologists have found that 
when making decisions about events in the distant future, individuals focus on 
the abstract properties of the decision, but in the short-term they tend to focus 
on the most concrete terms.29  Time delay shifts the attractiveness of an option 
towards its high-level construal, and near-future choices shift the attractiveness 
towards the low-level construal.30  Additionally, primary aspects of options are 
more important in the distant future, while secondary aspects of options play a 
greater role in the near future.31  Finally, feasibility—the possibility that 
something could happen—appears to be more of a secondary or low-level 
construal, while desirability is a primary or high-level construal.32  So, for 
example, in one experiment, individuals choosing which lectures to attend 
chose the distant-future lecture according to topic, but chose the near-future 
lecture according to timing.33  Participants likewise chose a distant-future 
reading assignment based on interest level, but chose a near-future assignment 
based on level of difficulty.34 
 
 24. Id. at 406 
 25. Trope & Liberman, supra note 20, at 406. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 407. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Trope & Liberman, supra note 20, at 407. 
 31. Id. at 408. 
 32. Id. at 411. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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Similarly, consider the case of subjects in an experiment who were asked 
to select a snack that they would have once a week for the next three weeks.35  
Subjects reliably chose a variety of items to enjoy at snack time.36  But subjects 
who were asked to pick their snacks each week did not pick a variety: they 
reliably chose the same item each week.37  If one assumes that the present 
self’s preferences are the “true” preferences, then those who chose snacks in 
advance for the entire three-week period made an error.  Why?  It seems as 
though when looking at “the whole picture,” more abstract attributes like 
variety, diversity, and opportunity are more important in decision-making, but 
when considering the immediate choice of what to actually eat, attributes like 
chocolate, or crunchy, or cheesy (or perhaps merely “my favorite”) are more 
important. 
In a way, one might conceptualize the self here as stable: the preferences 
remain the same for an individual, merely differing depending on the timing.  
That is, we always want X for our present and Y for our future, regardless of 
whether we’re asked in January or July, 1995 or 2010.  But since we constantly 
move forward in time, our present selves become our future selves all too soon, 
and what our present self might want for its future incarnation clashes with 
what that future incarnation does actually want.  The Enlightenment’s vision of 
the stable self cannot make sense of the individual whose preferences about the 
very same options change merely due to temporal distance. 
It is not possible to import these findings wholesale into the body of 
contract law; there is no simple answer to explain how temporal construal 
relates to every contract, or to contract law generally.  Some contracts bind the 
parties to take an action in the near future, while others bind parties for a 
lengthier term, including both the near and the more distant future.  Still other 
contracts may bind parties only in the distant future.  Because contracts are so 
varied in their terms and conditions, relating temporal construal to contracting 
behavior must be done on a more individualized basis.  But this research is 
clearly relevant to the ways that people think about their choices and their 
commitments.  People will perceive the features of contractual agreements 
differently when they think about them in the near future versus the distant 
future.  When thinking about contract terms that describe actions that will 
occur soon, contracting parties will focus on the details and the specifics.  But 
when thinking about contract terms that describe actions that will occur in the 
distant future, they will focus on the abstract and broad-brush essentials.  
Contract law pays little attention to this; instead, contract law largely pretends 
 
 35. Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking 
Behavior, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 150, 153, 156 (1990). 
 36. Id. at 158. 
 37. Id. at 156. 
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that individuals’ preferences are stable,38 perhaps because the alternative 
would destabilize contract law irrevocably, potentially eliminating the benefits 
of contracts altogether. 
There are, however, several contract doctrines that address the problems of 
shifting opportunities and preferences.  In efficient breach, for example, 
contract law allows parties to be released from their obligations if the 
breaching party compensates the other party for his or her loss of goods or 
services.39  Efficient breach allows people to take advantage of better, more 
efficient market opportunities;40 the doctrine is not expressly meant to address 
the party who simply changes his or her mind.  In any event, a stable, rational 
self would always prefer the choice with the highest market value, whether at 
time period one or at time period two.  In the efficient breach context, the 
problem is that the self was not aware of the most efficient option at time 
period one. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine of efficient breach leaves room for changing 
preferences to play an important role.  The doctrine is conceptually broad 
enough to encompass changing preferences that can be sufficiently monetized.  
For example, suppose party A contracts to sell goods to party B, but then 
changes her mind and decides she would derive greater utility from selling to 
party C.  Party A can efficiently breach and pay damages to party B if the 
difference in utility between the sales (however Party A may define such 
utility) is greater than the amount she will pay to B in damages.41 
Similarly, the doctrine of contracts of adhesion relates to temporal 
construal and potential changes in preference.  Contracts of adhesion, which 
are contracts of asymmetrical power, typically bind a small party to many 
future terms that might be onerous for her.42  The onerous future terms are 
 
 38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 39. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 133–34 (6th ed. 2003); Jody S. 
Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1637 (2009); 
Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 629, 630 (1988). 
 40. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 133. 
 41. Perhaps because the doctrine of efficient breach is so neutral as to outcome, because it 
merely privileges the outcome that provides the most utility, a number of commentators have 
attacked it on moral grounds.  See Kraus, supra note 39, at 1605–06; Seana V. Shiffrin, The 
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 730–32 (2007).  Indeed, the use of 
the doctrine to allow breach to be considered efficient merely when someone might prefer a 
different outcome (thus deriving greater utility) brings up a grave concern with the stability of 
contracts in an “efficient breach” world.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific 
Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 
CAL. L. REV. 975, 978 (2005). 
 42. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “adhesion contract” as a standard form contract 
“offered . . . on essentially ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording consumer realistic 
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probabilistic rather than certain, and the abstract, high-level construal of the 
future terms of such a contract is more salient to the party than the concrete, 
low-level construal of those terms.43  For example, the high-level construal of 
enjoying a cruise preoccupies the contracting party, while the low-level 
construal of the accelerated payment schedule, the required arbitration clause, 
or even the high-interest monthly payments (not due for six months, perhaps) 
fade.  Legal safeguards designed to protect low-power consumers in these 
settings are a way to protect people who are bedazzled by the present benefit 
and may fail to accurately comprehend the future consequences.44 
III.  WHAT PEOPLE REALLY WANT 
Finally, the vision of a fully self-aware, unitary, and stable self is belied by 
a robust body of research suggesting that people are, simply put, not very good 
at knowing what will make them happy.  A host of research on happiness has 
suggested that people are terrible predictors of how events will impact their 
level of happiness—what researchers call “affective forecasting.”45  
Individuals think that large-scale events, like winning the lottery, will make 
them happy, but actual lottery winners report no higher level of happiness than 
non-lottery winners.46  Similarly, negative events do not have the same long-
term impact that most people expect them to have.47  Part of the reason that 
 
opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or 
services except by acquiescing in form contract.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990). 
 43. For another way of viewing contracts of adhesion that similarly relies on the difference 
in salient features, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003). 
 44. Similarly, courts have found certain contract terms unconscionable in ways that dovetail 
with temporal construal.  For example, the Fourth Circuit found that employment contract terms 
were too one-sided in favor of the employer in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 
938–39 (4th Cir. 1999).  In that case, one could imagine that when thinking about her 
employment contract in the long-term, the employee was not focused on the concrete details of 
who might make-up an arbitration panel if she became involved in a dispute with the company, 
but rather on the larger conceptual element of having a steady job with a stable company. 
 45. For a review of this literature, see Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective 
Forecasting, in 35 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 345, 353 (Mark P. 
Zanna ed., 2003).  Wilson and Gilbert describe the most common affective forecasting error, the 
impact bias, as people’s tendency to “overestimate the impact of future events on their emotional 
reactions.”  Id. 
 46. Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 
36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 917 (1978).  Similarly, although people predict that 
others will be happier living in California than living in the Midwest because of the better 
weather, people in both settings report similar levels of happiness.  David A. Schkade & Daniel 
Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of 
Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 342–43 (1998). 
 47. See, e.g., Eunkook Suh et al., Events and Subjective Well-Being: Only Recent Events 
Matter, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1091, 1096 (1996). 
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people are such poor predictors of happiness is that they are more adaptable to 
circumstances—both positive and negative—than they realize.48  Indeed, 
research in psychology suggests that people are tremendously adaptable to a 
wide variety of changing circumstances, in ways that the law does not always 
acknowledge or respect.49  For example, Samuel Bagenstos and Margo 
Schlanger have suggested that “hedonic damages”—damages that compensate 
for the loss of happiness—are misguided.50  Marshalling research that 
documents the happiness of those with disabilities,51 they argue that when the 
law allows recovery for this type of damages, the law actually may foster 
unhappiness among disabled people by suggesting to them that their lives must 
be wanting.52  The law, rather than acting neutrally, suggests to people what 
the appropriate reaction is to their circumstances.53 
The role of apology in litigation follows a similar course.  Apologies have 
been found to have important effects on parties: cases where apologies are 
offered seem to settle more frequently,54 more quickly,55 and with lower 
litigation costs.56  Claimants who have been offered an apology may change 
their aspirations,57 and apologies help to preserve relationships and may even 
forestall lawsuits.58  Yet lawyers are notoriously hostile to the idea of 
 
 48. For a discussion of this “psychological immune system,” see Daniel T. Gilbert et al., 
Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 619 (1998). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 750 (2007). 
 51. Id. at 763–69. 
 52. Id. at 774 (“When courts uphold hedonic damages awards based on the view that 
disabling injuries limit life’s enjoyment and keep plaintiffs from being a ‘whole person,’ they 
entrench the societal view that disability is inherently tragic, and encourage people with 
disabilities to see their lives as tragedies.”). 
 53. A number of legal scholars have recently considered the role that poor affective 
forecasting may play in a variety of legal contexts.  See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Happiness 
and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1080 (2009); Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How 
the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can 
Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 216–17 (2009); 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From Outcome 
to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 935, 935–36 (2009). 
 54. Chris S. Hyman & Clyde B. Schechter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits 
Against Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1394, 1395 (2006). 
 55. Steve S. Kraman, A Risk Management Program Based on Full Disclosure and Trust:  
Does Everyone Win?, 27 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 253, 254–55 (2001). 
 56. Id. at 255. 
 57. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
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apologies,59 and our legal system has traditionally discouraged apologies by 
allowing apologies that include an admission of injury to be admissible as 
evidence at trial.60  Indeed, Jennifer Robbennolt has found that the effects of 
apologies on lawyers are almost the inverse of the effects on clients in some 
respects: lawyers are largely indifferent to the emotional appeal of apologies, 
and certain types of apologies tend to make lawyers raise, rather than lower, 
their expectations about what they ought to receive in settlement.61  If what 
injured people truly want—what will feel, to them, like real redress—includes 
an apology from a wrongdoer, then our legal system, both its infrastructure and 
its primary players, must rethink its approach to defining recompense through 
money alone.  And, in fact, a number of states have recently acted to encourage 
apologies by making such statements inadmissible in court.62 
In a related vein, research has suggested that people thinking about what 
they want out of litigation or other dispute resolution processes may believe 
that they want the most amount of money possible.63  After a dispute is 
resolved, however, people report that they care a lot about the fairness of the 
treatment—the procedural justice—that they received, sometimes even more 
than the financial outcome.64  As with affective forecasting, individuals have 
difficulty predicting what will make them feel satisfied with the resolution of a 
dispute.  Recent research has indicated that individuals even care about 
procedural justice in dispute resolution settings without a third party, such as 
negotiation.65  Although lawyers are accustomed to the procedural safeguards 
that surround litigation, arbitration, and even mediation, they are not 
necessarily fully aware of the effects of fairness in these settings, let alone in 
even more informal dispute resolution processes.  If parties truly value fairness 
of process, either separate and apart from the monetary value of their 
outcomes, or sometimes even more than the monetary value of their outcomes, 
then it may be time to rethink the way that lawyers advise clients and resolve 
cases in our legal system. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have identified just a handful of ways in which empirical 
data help us understand the effect that the law and legal systems can have on 
individuals, their preferences, and their behavior.  The Enlightenment era 
paved the way for the empirical data on human behavior that I have 
highlighted here.  And yet that same research fundamentally undermines the 
Enlightenment vision of a stable, unitary, fully knowable self.  Ironically, an 
understanding of the way in which the law can effect change on individual 
behavior belies the Enlightenment’s conception of the stable, unitary self.  As 
Professor powell urges, the project of the Enlightenment is not complete.  
When these two titans of the Enlightenment clash, it is imperative that we 
continue to explore and process the role of empirical data, rather than cling to 
an outdated vision of the self, so that the law can better understand, 
deliberately shape, or adequately respond to the realities of human behavior. 
 
